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AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF COLLABORATIVE PRACTICE
John Lande
______________________________________________________________________
This article summarizes empirical research about Collaborative Practice, the
Collaborative movement, its interaction with other parts of the dispute resolution field,
and its impact on the field. It reviews studies of Collaborative Practice describing the
individuals involved in Collaborative cases, how the process works, the operation of local
practice groups, and the impact of Collaborative Practice on legal practice generally.
Based on this analysis, it suggests an agenda for future research. Finally, it offers
suggestions for constructive development of the Collaborative field.
Keywords: Collaborative; research; empirical; practice groups; legal practice
________________________________________________________________________
I. INTRODUCTION
In its two decades of existence, Collaborative Practice (CP)1 has grown
dramatically. In CP, parties sign  a  “participation  agreement”  establishing  a  negotiation  
process in which they use interest-based negotiation and commit to disclose all relevant
information.    The  “disqualification”  provision  in  the  agreement  is  the  essential  feature  of  
CP. It provides that both CP lawyers would be disqualified from representing their
clients if the case is litigated. The disqualification provision is intended to motivate
parties and professionals to focus exclusively on negotiation. If the parties terminate a
CP process, they do not lose their right to go to court but would need to hire new lawyers
if they want legal representation.
The Collaborative process can vary in a number of ways. For example, in some
cases, parties hire only lawyers to negotiate with each other. In other models, in addition
to lawyers, parties hire other professionals such as child development specialists,
financial specialists, and mental health coaches to help parties communicate effectively.
Some   practitioners   prefer   a   “team   model,”   where the parties assemble a team of
professionals  from  the  outset  of  the  case.    Others  prefer  a  “referral  model,”  where  parties  
hire additional professionals only as needed by the parties. Some practitioners prefer a
one-coach model, where a single neutral coach serves both clients, while others prefer a
two-coach model, where each party hires its own separate coach.2
Minneapolis family lawyer Stuart Webb developed CP in 1990 with a small
group of Collaborative Lawyers in the Twin Cities.3 Since then, it has grown
dramatically   and   has   developed   “an   impressive   infrastructure   of   local   practice groups,
general and specialized trainings, law school course offerings, ethical codes, professional
associations, websites, articles, and books.
Collaborative practice groups have developed public relations strategies and have
received   much   favorable   publicity.”4 The International Academy of Collaborative
Professionals (IACP) has 4,200 members in 24 countries and has identified more than
300 Collaborative practice groups.5 The   Uniform   Law   Commission’s   adoption   of   the  
Uniform Collaborative Law Act is the latest and perhaps most significant indicator that
CP  has  “arrived”  as  a  legitimate  process  of  dispute  resolution.
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A few research studies of CP have been conducted, giving a sketchy empirical
portrait of Collaborative Practice, the CP movement, its interaction with other parts of the
dispute resolution field, and its impact on the field. Part II of this Article reviews studies
of CP describing the individuals involved in Collaborative cases, how the process works,
the operation of local practice groups, and the impact of CP on legal practice generally.
Part III suggests an agenda for future research. Part IV offers suggestions for
constructive development of the CP field.
A. EMPIRICAL STUDIES CONDUCTED TO DATE
Researchers have used various methods to collect data about CP in the past
decade. Brief descriptions of the research methods and data sources of these projects are
as follows, in chronological order.
In 2001-2004, Julie Macfarlane conducted a study involving 66 initial interviews
with clients, lawyers, and other Collaborative professionals at nine sites in the United
States and Canada. In the second phase, she selected four locations with well-established
CP communities representing different practice philosophies. In each location,
interviews were conducted of clients and professionals throughout four cases. A total of
150 interviews were conducted for the 16 case studies.6
In 2003, William Schwab surveyed Collaborative lawyers and clients. Surveys
were sent to CP lawyers from eight well-established local practice groups in seven states
in the US. The cover letters indicated that the IACP supported the survey. Schwab
received at least partial responses from 71 lawyers and 25 clients. This represented a
20% response rate for lawyers and at least a 7% response rate for clients. This research
also included one case study.7
In 2004, Richard Shields conducted a study focusing on six attendees of a CP
training in Ontario, Canada. He attended the training, interviewed six trainers, and
interviewed the attendees several times over the following year.8
Gay Cox & Syd Sharples conducted separate surveys of Collaborative clients,
primarily  in  Texas.    Cox’s  survey  included  42  clients  from  cases  that  she  and  five  other  
lawyers conducted. These surveys were conducted over a five-year period ending in
2006. In 2005, Sharples received 35 client surveys from clients of lawyers and she
conducted follow-up interviews of 18 of these clients and received an email from one of
them.9
Starting on October 15, 2006, the IACP collected information from practitioners
about their cases in a Collaborative Practice Survey. At the end of each case, a
professional in the case was asked to answer questions about the case, sometimes in
consultation with the other professionals in the case. As of July 6, 2010, professionals
from 5 countries, 28 states and the District of Columbia, and 3 Canadian provinces
reported 932 cases. Gay Cox and Linda Wray, members of the IACP Research
Committee, separately published two articles based on the first 793 cases in the dataset.
The   IACP   Research   Committee   also   distributed   a   “Frequently   Asked   Questions”  
information sheet based on this data.10 In addition, the IACP surveyed clients and
received responses from 84 clients between 2007 and August 24, 2009.11
In 2007, John Lande conducted a study of lawyers who are members of the
Divorce Cooperation Institute (DCI), who offer Cooperative Practice in Wisconsin, about
half of whom also offer Collaborative practice. Cooperative Practice involves structured
negotiation, somewhat similar to CP, but does not include the disqualification agreement.
DCI members who do Collaborative cases may have less faith in the value of CP than
Collaborative lawyers in the other studies. Lande conducted ten semi-structured
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interviews of DCI members, six of whom had handled some Collaborative cases. Lande
sent a detailed survey, delivered to 64 DCI members and he received 24 responses (38%),
of which 18 respondents completed the full survey (28%). Solicitations for interviews
and surveys included a request from a DCI officer to participate. Fifty-six percent of the
respondents said that they had handled one or more Collaborative cases. Except as
otherwise noted, the data summarized in this article refer only to DCI members who are
members of the statewide CP group or who handled at least one CP case.12
In 2008, Michaela Keet and Wanda Wiegers published two studies describing CP
in   the   Canadian   province   of   Saskatchewan.      Both   studies   involved   “interpretive  
phenomenal analysis”   of   qualitative   interviews   of   seven   clients   who   used   CP   and   one  
client who attended an initial negotiation meeting that did not turn into a CP case. They
also analyzed interviews of 12 lawyer members of the local CP practice group.13
In 2008, Mark Sefton sent a survey to all 999 members of Resolution, an
organization of family lawyers in England and Wales who had CP training. He received
300 responses, for a response rate of 30%. He also conducted six focus groups with a
total of 40 lawyers and he interviewed 12 clients recruited from the lawyers who
participated in the survey and focus groups.14
In 2008 John Lande and Forrest Mosten conducted a content analysis of eight CP
books and 126 websites of CP practice groups in the US.15
B. METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
These studies reflect methodological challenges in studying CP, many of which
are generally problematic in studying dispute resolution outside the litigation system. In
general, social science research is intended to provide the most realistic possible
representation of the subject being studied, i.e., to be as valid as possible. Empirical
research is inevitably imperfect as systematic methodological errors – or  “biases”  – cause
the findings to provide a distorted image of the subject to some degree. Researchers try
to identify and minimize such biases, recognizing that it is impossible to eliminate them
completely. Researchers and readers may speculate what more accurate representations
would be in the absence of particular biases.
Potential sample selection bias is a problem with virtually all the CP studies.
Because  there  is  no  central  registry  of  Collaborative  cases,  like  a  court  clerk’s  office,  it  is  
impossible to get a comprehensive list of cases.16 Without such a sampling frame,
researchers cannot randomly select cases. Many of the studies rely on sampling of (or
through) lawyers, which can contribute to selection bias.17 Collaborative lawyers
generally associate with local practice groups, making it easier to develop a sampling
frame, but it is unclear how many Collaborative lawyers are not members of such groups.
Moreover, if there is an uneven distribution of cases among Collaborative lawyers, so
that a small percentage of lawyers handle a disproportionately large number of
Collaborative cases as the current data suggests,18 obtaining an equal number of cases
from each lawyer (such as one case) would not be representative of the population of
Collaborative cases. The self-selection reporting process also may contribute to some
sampling bias if, for example, professionals are less likely to report cases that are not
settled.
The IACP Collaborative Practice Survey attempts to avoid this problem by trying
to conduct a census of all cases during a specified period. This is an improvement in
theory, though there are two practical problems with this approach. First, some
Collaborative cases may be handled by lawyers who are not members of local practice
groups. More problematic is the fact that participation by IACP members has been
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uneven, with relatively few cases reported from many jurisdictions, reflecting some
selection bias in the sampling. Perhaps this pattern of reporting reflects the true
distribution of Collaborative cases, but that is impossible to know.
“Social   desirability”   bias   can   affect   some   of   the   studies   as   some   subjects   may  
give responses that they think the researchers want to hear instead of their actual views.
Most of the studies were conducted by or on behalf of Collaborative or Cooperative
practitioners or organizations, which may have affected the responses, though social
desirability bias can affect independently-sponsored research as well.
All of these studies lack comparison groups and thus interpreting the data
requires some assumptions about the impact of Collaborative Practice. Without a
comparison for reference, one cannot determine whether findings would have been
different if another dispute resolution process had been used. Ideally, cases should be
randomly assigned to different processes so that any differences could be attributed to the
process as opposed to other factors. For example, if randomly-assigned parties are
equally satisfied with CP and another process, presumably the process is not a critical
factor affecting the satisfaction level. There are very few field studies of dispute
resolution involving random assignment because it is difficult to get parties to agree to
this procedure. Instead, most studies with comparison groups rely on self-selection into
the groups and, if possible, use statistical  methods  to  “control”  extraneous  variables  that  
might distort the apparent effect of the dispute resolution process. The Sefton study
attempts to address this issue by asking subjects to indicate what process they think
parties would have used and how the cost and time in CP compares with the other process
they might have used.19 This identifies the appropriate comparison and may be better
than having no data about these questions, though it obviously relies on a great deal of
speculation.
Many of   these   studies   rely   on   subjects’   self-reports, which obviously can
contribute to some bias and would produce different findings than what independent
observers might report. Subjects may not be able to provide accurate reports for many
reasons, including social desirability bias and lack of external perspective for
observation. In particular, some questions in studies without comparison groups
essentially ask subjects to make their own implicit comparisons between the dispute
resolution process they used and another process they imagine they might have used
instead. (The Sefton study is an exception in that it explicitly asks subjects to make these
comparisons.) For example, in answering a question about satisfaction, a party may
answer based on a comparison  with  the  party’s  assumption  about  how  satisfied  she  would  
have been in another process. This is particularly problematic for parties who have little
experience with different dispute resolution processes. Although professionals generally
have more such experience, their assessments may be colored by their general views of
the processes, such as a preference for certain processes over others.
Almost all of the studies rely on small samples, which make it hard to generalize
to the broad population of Collaborative clients, lawyers, or cases. Large samples would
be particularly important considering that CP varies along many dimensions including
configurations of professionals used, amount of Collaborative experience, local practice
norms, and level of case difficulty, among others. Small-sample qualitative studies are
appropriate for identifying complex beliefs, behavior patterns, and outcomes. These
findings themselves cannot provide good estimates about the overall population, but can
be useful in designing larger studies that can provide better estimates and test hypotheses
about the subject.
This cursory review of the studies and their methodological limitations indicates
that the research findings to date should be interpreted very cautiously. The field is

Lande / AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF COLLABORATIVE PRACTICE

5

young  and  has  developed  since  Macfarlane’s  pioneering  study,  so  the  dynamics  observed  
may have changed since then. This highlights the importance of conducting additional
research that replicates some measures, addresses the methodological issues, and focuses
on gaps in the findings. Part III provides specific recommendations for further research.
II. SUMMARY OF EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
A.

COLLABORATIVE
PARTIES,
PROFESSIONALS

LAWYERS,

AND

ADDITIONAL

1. Demographic Characteristics of Collaborative Clients
The   research   suggests   that   Collaborative   clients   are   primarily   “white,   middleaged,  well  educated  and  affluent.”    In  Schwab’s  study,  all  of  the  clients  were  Caucasian  
with an average age of 49. Eighty-four percent had completed a four-year college degree
and 32% had graduate degrees. Eighty-four percent had annual, pre-divorce combined
household   income   over   $100,000   and   40%   had   incomes   over   $200,000.      Clients’  
marriages averaged 22.2 years and 72% of clients had at least one child under 18 at the
time of divorce.20
Clients’  demographic  characteristics  were  similar  in  Sefton’s  study,  where  81%  
of clients were 35-54 years old and 11% were 55-64. Thirty-two percent had a first
degree   or   equivalent   (comparable   to   a   bachelor’s   degree   in   the   US) and an additional
42% had higher degrees.21 In recently opened or completed cases, 27% of parties had
assets between £250,000 and £500,000, 26% had assets between £500,000 and £1
million, and 29% had family assets over £1 million.22 (Currently, £1 is worth about
$1.60.)23 Although  29%  of  lawyers  in  Sefton’s  study  handled  legal  aid  cases,  they  had  not  
used CP with legal aid clients because of restrictions in legal aid funding.23 Eighty-one
percent of clients had children under 18.24
In the IACP dataset, 84% of cases involved children, including 17% where the
children were not subject to the legal process, presumably because they were over the age
of majority in their jurisdictions or had different parentage.25
2. Clients’  Reasons  for  Choosing  Collaborative Practice
The studies found that clients had multiple reasons for using CP. The reasons
cited in the various studies were similar, though there were differences about the priority
of different reasons, particularly the prospect of possible cost savings. In most of the
studies, potential cost savings was cited as a secondary factor.
In   Schwab’s   study,   clients   said   that   they   were   motivated   to   try   CP   primarily  
because   of   the   "impact   on   children"   (44%)   and   concern   for   their   “co-parenting
relationship”  (32%).    Twenty  percent  were  motivated  by  their  lawyers’  recommendations  
of CP and 20% of clients ranked "cost savings" as the most important factor. Forty-four
percent first heard about CP from their lawyer, 16% from their spouse, 16% from a
counselor or therapist, and the remainder from friends, newspapers and the internet.26
In   Sefton’s   study,   lawyers   said   that   clients   were   interested   in   CP   to   protect  
children’s  interests,  maintain  good  co-parent relationships, save time and money, provide
fair outcomes, and avoid going to court. Clients said that a prime concern was to avoid
the stress of adversarial divorce by avoiding court if possible. They believed that they
would be able to achieve better results through direct negotiation, with appropriate
support. They also sought fairness and timely resolution of issues.27
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In   IACP’s   Client   Experience   Survey,   the   factors   considered   most   important   in  
choosing   to   use   CP   included   quality   of   the   outcome,   focus   on   clients’   most   important  
concerns, tailoring of the process  to  clients’  situation,  respectfulness  and  non-adversarial
nature of the process, level of stress in the process, access to a team of professionals,
sufficient   time   to   address   clients’   concerns,   and   control   over   the   outcome.      Cost   was  
regarded  as  “somewhat”  to  “very  important”  in  choosing  CP.28
In  Macfarlane’s  study,  many  clients  sought  CP  to  avoid  the  expense  and  delay  as  
well as the emotional costs of litigation. Many believed that CP would be better for their
children as it would help parents maintain a better relationship and model good behavior.
Although  some  saw  litigation  as  a  “painful  but  easy”  option  where  lawyers  would  fight  
for them, it also frightened clients. Some saw CP as helping them deal with emotions
raised by separation, find closure,   or   embark   on   a   “spiritual   journey.”29 The primary
reasons that parties said they preferred CP over mediation were that it would help work
through dysfunctional patterns better and they would do better by having an advocate in
the process. Thus CP was appealing to parties who would need emotional support and/or
help in negotiation. By contrast, in mediation, lawyers generally did not attend mediation
sessions. 30 Lawyers  in  Sefton’s  study  gave  a  similar  analysis  of  mediation  and  said  that  
they would recommend it if parties could not afford CP or if the decisions focused on
parenting issues.31
In  Keet’s  study,  parties  generally  decided  to  use  CP  to  resolve  matters  with  the  
least amount of conflict, get a fair outcome, and avoid court. Their lawyers had
encouraged them to try it but none felt pressured to do so.32
3. Collaborative  Lawyers’  Backgrounds  and  Practices
Research findings suggest that most Collaborative lawyers have been in practice
for an extended time and most are women. A small proportion of lawyers handle most of
the cases.
In  Schwab’s  study,  Collaborative  lawyers  had  been  in  practice  an  average  of  20  
years and were, on average, 60 years old. Women comprised 60% of the sample. Fortytwo percent were solo practitioners and 38% were in firms of two to ten lawyers. Over
half of the lawyers said that family law accounted for at least 90% of their practice. All
the lawyers said that they had received some training in CP, with an average of 24.7
hours of training.33 In  Sefton’s  survey,  the median length of time in practice was 11-15
years.34 Women accounted for 70% of the sample.35
In  Schwab’s  study,  lawyers  reported  having  an  average  of  11.3  cases  per  lawyer,  
though most of the cases were handled by a few lawyers. The 12 lawyers in the sample
(17%) who handled the most CP cases handled 52% of all the reported cases, whereas 24
lawyers (34%) handled three or fewer cases. On average, 23% of their divorce cases
were Collaborative representations. Less than one in five (17%) said that at least half of
their cases were Collaborative. The modal response was that Collaborative cases
constituted 1% of their caseload.36
In   Sefton’s   study,   56%   of   lawyers   had   completed   at   least   one   CP   case,   12%  
opened but had not completed a case, and 31% had not opened a case in 2006-2007. CP
caseloads increased from 2006 to 2007 as the percentage of lawyers opening at least one
case increased from 46% to 85% and the percentage completing at least one case
increased  from  39%  to  67%.    As  in  Schwab’s  study,  CP cases were unevenly distributed.
Ten percent of the lawyers did not open any cases in 2006-2007 and 51% opened 1-3
cases. On the other hand, 15% opened 7-12 cases and 4% opened more than 13 cases.
At the end of 2007, according to membership renewal forms, 42% of the members did
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not have any cases open at that time, 44% had 1-3 open cases, 12% had 4-6 open cases,
and 3% had 7 or more open cases.37
4. Lawyers’  Reasons  for  Choosing  Collaborative  Practice
Lawyers had multiple reasons for choosing CP. Macfarlane’s   study   found   that  
CP  “eliminated  stress  and  pain  of  litigation  for  themselves  and  their  clients  and  provided  
a  reason  to  stay  in  practice.”    Lawyers  most  frequently  expressed  interest  in  CP  because  
of  “abhorrence  of  litigation,”  which  got  “under their  skin.”    Lawyers  saw  CP  as  a  way  to  
provide better service to clients and help them negotiate constructive outcomes for their
families. CP enabled them to get greater satisfaction by synthesizing their personal and
professional values. Some believed   that   CP   offered   better   or   “more   complete”   dispute  
resolution services than mediation and they became interested in CP out of
disappointment in mediation. Some wanted to use skills from mediation training and
were disappointed that they did not have opportunities to mediate.38
For  some  lawyers,  there  was  a  “quasi-evangelical  quality”  to  CP  that  “bordered  
on   an   ideological   commitment.”      Lawyers’   commitment   to   CP   was   strengthened   by  
shared   values   in   the   “club”   culture   of   local   practice   groups,   which   reinforced local
practice norms and behaviors. Some CP lawyers previously had highly litigious
practices,   which   they   used   to   enjoy,   but   experienced   “conversions”   to   CP.      Although  
some  saw  CP  merely  as  a  marketing  tool,  the  vast  majority  were  “motivated  by  a  desire
for self-improvement  and  enhanced  client  service.”39
The Sefton and Keet studies generally found similar motivations as in
Macfarlane’s  study.    Sefton  found  that  lawyers  generally  became  Collaborative  lawyers  
because they were dissatisfied with other dispute resolution processes, especially
litigation   and   conventional   negotiation.      They   felt   “demoralised   operating   against   a  
backdrop   of   litigation”   and   that   CP   provided   preferable   experiences   and   outcomes   for  
clients. CP also provided benefits to lawyers, including feeling better about themselves
and their work and providing additional practice opportunities.40 Keet found that the
lawyers strongly believed in the value of CP and it benefits for themselves and their
clients.41
Shields analyzed the developmental paths of CP trainees and identified
circumstances affecting decisions to pursue CP training and develop a CP practice.
These included pre-learning context, Collaborative training, post-learning context,
reflective learning, dialogic learning, and perspective transformation. Collaborative
practitioners   often   use   the   phrase   “paradigm   shift”   and   Shields   defined   this  
transformation as moving from a lawyer-directed, rights-based approach to a clientcentered, interest-based  approach.    In  trainees’  pre-learning context, some experienced a
“disorienting  dilemma”  prompting  them  to  reject  an  earlier  approach  to  practice,  though  
for others, CP was a natural extension of their prior practice. After receiving training,
lawyers had varying reactions. Some worked to develop a Collaborative practice and
others continued much as before. Those pursuing a Collaborative practice recognized
problems in their prior assumptions through reflection and dialogue, which led them to
transform their perspectives and become Collaborative practitioners.42
5. Lawyer-Client Relationships
Based on her study, Macfarlane created a typology of three general perspectives
of   CP   lawyers,   which   is   helpful   in   analyzing   lawyers’   conceptions   of   their   roles   in   the  
various studies. The three types are the cooperative legal advisor, the lawyer as friend
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and healer, and the team player. Macfarlane noted that few, if any, lawyers identified
with only one of these types. Cooperative legal advisors believed that their primary duty
is to their clients   (rather   than   the   “whole   family”   or   professional   team)   and   that   it   is  
important  for  CP  lawyers  to  give  clients  legal  advice.    Lawyers  who  identified  as  “friends  
and   healers”   saw   their   role   as   providing   a   supportive   and   healing   process   rather   than  
advocacy for clients and were wary about focusing on legal rights. Lawyers who
identified   as   team   players   were   similar   to   “friends   and   healers”   but   their   priority   of  
protecting the integrity of the CP process trumped other goals such as maximizing client
satisfaction or meeting legal standards.43
Related to these conceptions of their roles, lawyers had different approaches to
advocacy and addressing the interests of the other party. Sometimes, lawyers addressed
the  other  side’s  interests  by  identifying  their  own  client’s  interests  in  satisfying  the  other  
side’s   interests.      Most   Collaborative   lawyers   believed   that   their   primary   responsibility  
was   to   their   clients,   though   some   felt   a   duty   to   protect   the   “whole   family”   or   the   CP  
process, even if this was contrary  to  their  own  clients’  goals.    Macfarlane  found  that  there  
was  a  “mismatch”  between  clients’  goals  and  lawyers’  motivations  in  a  minority  of  cases.    
Clients often had pragmatic goals in dealing with a life crisis whereas some lawyers had
personal goals of   emphasizing   “whole   family”   solutions   and   certain   models   of   coparenting.44
Macfarlane found that CP lawyers often did not articulate their approaches to
their clients. For example, clients often did not know how much or how little legal
advice that their lawyers would provide, as some lawyers believed that giving legal
advice  was  necessary  while  others  thought  that  it  “contaminates”  the  CP  process.    Some  
clients felt frustrated when their lawyers did not provide clear and specific legal advice,
especially when they were at an apparent impasse and the other side seemed
unreasonable.      Indeed,   some   clients   were   disappointed   with   their   lawyers’   advocacy  
when they felt that the law was on their side. In these situations, the lawyers provided
“quasi-therapeutic”  advice,  which  was  not  what  some  clients  wanted.    She  also  found  that  
some clients were uncomfortable when the two lawyers seemed too friendly with each
other  or  when  their  own  lawyer  wanted  to  “bond”  with  the  other  party.45
Macfarlane found that the CP process changed the dynamics of control between
lawyers and clients. CP gave clients greater control over both the outcome and process
than in traditional representation, though lawyers also increased their control of the
process   and   clients’   behavior   through advice about strategy and process. In traditional
representation,  lawyers  took   more   “ownership”  of  the   problems,   whereas  in   CP,   clients  
were expected to take more responsibility for solving their problems. Most clients
appreciated having more control, though some felt that they surrendered control to the
other  side  and  “the  process.”46
In   Schwab’s   study,   the   vast   majority   of   lawyers   would   fit   in   Macfarlane’s  
“cooperative   advisor”   category.      Eighty-four percent disagreed with the statement that
“Collaborative lawyers are more like neutrals than like counsel for individual clients,"
whereas only 7% agreed. Similarly, 93% believed Collaborative lawyers need to meet
privately with clients after the CP agreement is in place, compared with 6% who
disagreed.47
In   Sefton’s   study,   the   lawyers   did   not   fit   neatly   into   Macfarlane’s   categories.    
They believed that their primary duty was to their clients, though they also felt some
obligation to the family, the CP team, and/or the CP process. They believed that it was
essential to provide their clients with legal advice, though were careful about the timing
and manner of doing so. The lawyers believed that clients should know what the law
provides but that clients are not required to follow the law. Rather, the law is an
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important  “reality  check”  to  help  clients  whose  expectations  were  unrealistically  high  or  
low. Rather than specifying a single court outcome, they often presented clients with a
range of possible outcomes. Lawyers would sometimes coordinate their opinions with
each other, often by giving them in four-way meetings or writing joint letters to both
clients. If they gave opinions privately to clients, they normally disclosed the opinions to
the other side. Lawyers generally believed that they should cede as much control of the
negotiation as possible to the parties. This included setting the agenda, doing the talking,
and making decisions.48
Clients  in  Sefton’s  study  wanted  their  lawyers  to  represent  their  interests  and  to  
support them personally and legally, though they expected their lawyers would challenge
them  or  advocate  the  other  party’s  interests  at  times.    Most  clients  said  that  they  received  
all  the  legal  advice  they  needed,  though  two  were  frustrated  that  the  lawyer’s  advice  was  
not clear or that the lawyer was reluctant to give any advice about possible outcomes.
Clients generally felt that they participated to the extent that they wanted, though some
felt that they were expected to take more responsibility for negotiation than they
wanted.49
In the Wiegers & Keet study, lawyers varied in their approach to providing legal
advice to clients. Some had a more traditional approach, believing that it was important
to  assess  clients’  legal  rights.    Others  resisted  giving  clients  legal  advice, fearing that it
would stimulate adversarial interactions. Such lawyers summarized the law but
“avoid[ed]   characterizing   it   as   an   entitlement   or   obligation”   or   interpreting   it   in   their  
clients’  favor.50
In   Keet’s   study,   parties   – including some who were dissatisfied with the CP
process – generally liked and respected their lawyers, thought that they generally did a
good job, and would hire them again in the future. Clients particularly relied on their
lawyers for emotional support and generally appreciated their communication and
process management interventions. One party was complimentary about both lawyers in
her case but was frustrated when her lawyer dissuaded her from withdrawing from the
process,   saying,   “[T]hat's   their   job,   that's   what   they're   supposed   to   do.”      Another   party  
thought her lawyer did not know how to deal with abusive dynamics in her case.51
6. Additional Professionals
Parties used professionals in addition to lawyers in a substantial percentage of
cases. These professionals often provided valuable services, though clients were
sometimes concerned about the additional cost.
The IACP research found a wide variety of patterns of usage of professionals in
CP cases. In 45% of cases, parties used a lawyer-only model, in 40%, they used  a  “team  
model,”   and   in   15%   they   used   a   “referral   model.”52 Overall, 22% of cases had one
mental health professional (MHP), 13% had two MHPs, and 7% had three MHPs. There
were substantial differences in local practice culture.
The model practiced predominantly in Texas involves both clients
retaining one neutral MHP (who is not referred to as a coach); in
Northern California, the predominant model involves each of the clients
having an MHP as a coach; in Georgia, the majority of clients hire a
coach and both parties also retain a child specialist. And in New York
and Canada, clients most often do not retain any MHPs.
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Forty-seven percent of cases involved a financial professional, 92% of
whom served as neutrals. There were regional differences in use of
financial professionals ranging from 18% in Canada to 95% in Georgia.
Mediators were almost never used (97%).53
Sefton found that lawyers were increasingly enthusiastic about using other
professionals in CP cases, who they felt advanced the process when the lawyers were
“out  of  their  depth.”    Some  clients  were  reluctant  to  engage  additional  professionals  due  
to cost or pride.54
In  Lande’s  study,  60%  of  lawyers  believed  that  there  “often  is  an  expectation  to  
use  more  professionals  than  needed”  and  that  “in  a  substantial  number  of  Collaborative  
cases,  the  use  of  a  team  of  professionals  reduces  the  lawyers'  contribution  to  the  process.”    
Thirty  percent  believed  that  “in  a  substantial  number  of  Collaborative  cases,  the  use  of  a  
team of professionals reduces the parties' participation  in  decision  making.”55
In  Macfarlane’s  study,  parties  used  a  team  model  in  only  two  of  the  cases,  and  
when they used additional professionals, they generally did so on a referral basis. Some
lawyers thought that they did not have the skills needed to help parties with
communication   problems,   though   some   were   quite   comfortable   taking   a   “quasitherapeutic”   role.      Some   lawyers   tried   unsuccessfully   to   convince   the   parties   to   use   a  
team model, saying that it was harder to persuade them to use a team model than a
referral approach. When parties hired multiple professionals, sometimes issues arose
about professional boundaries (e.g., if lawyer acted in a therapeutic role) or which
professionals had control of the process. Clients who used additional professionals were
generally satisfied with their contributions, which sometimes provided reassurance that
settlement   options   were   appropriate,   though   in   one   case,   the   professional’s   advice  
became   a   “battleground.”      Some   parties   were   uncomfortable using coaches, which one
party   said   often   felt   “artificial.”      Some   were   also   concerned   about   the   added   cost   of  
additional professionals.56
B. THE COLLABORATIVE PROCESS
1.

Nature of the Process

The research found that the process in CP cases involves interest-based
negotiation in meetings with the parties, their lawyers, and often with other professionals,
which was often constructive. In some cases, lawyers and parties found CP to be too
slow and cumbersome and some parties felt vulnerable and unprotected.
Sefton found that in 47% of cases where there were minor children, the parties
dealt   with   financial   arrangements   for   the   adults   and   children   as   well   as   the   children’s  
upbringing. In 26% of these cases, the issues involved financial arrangements for adults
and  children  but  not  the  children’s  upbringing.    In  18%  of  these  cases,  the  issues  involved  
only financial arrangements for the adults.57
The IACP data indicates that 96% of cases had at least one joint face-to-face
meeting with both parties present. In 52% of cases, there was at least one meeting with
all core professionals in the case, with an average of four meetings. In 13% of cases,
there was only one meeting with all core professionals and in 36% of cases there were
five or more such meetings. The meetings lasted an average of 2.5 hours. In many cases,
parties met with various configurations of less than all of the core professionals. In 35%
of cases, there was a meeting with one party and a mental health professional or financial
professional without the other party and the lawyers.58 In   Lande’s   study,   60%   of   the  
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lawyers   believed   that   the   Collaborative   process   “often   is   too   cumbersome   and   timeconsuming”  and  that  there  “often  is  an  expectation  to  use  more  four-way meetings than
needed.”59
In   Sefton’s   study,   several   lawyers   believed   that   face-to-face meetings were
especially helpful in promoting understanding and negotiation. These meetings created
opportunities for emotional expression, which sometimes surprised the lawyers and
parties. Parties could proceed at their preferred pace, either more quickly or more slowly
than if they had gone through litigation, though sometimes parties differed about how
quickly they wanted to proceed.60
Macfarlane found that parties and lawyers generally used interest-based
negotiation procedures, discussing the process and exchanging information before
engaging   in   negotiation.      They   generally   did   not   engage   in   the   “posturing   and  
gamesmanship”   of   positional   negotiation,   though   they   occasionally reverted to this
approach, which was more likely when lawyers had little CP experience. Some clients
thought that their lawyers seemed to underestimate the level of emotionality in the
process and discouraged expression of emotion such as anger, hurt, or distress.
Sometimes,  clients  experienced  the  lawyers’  response  as  “denial  of  their  feelings  and  an  
attempt  to  impose  a  false  ‘harmony’  on  the  situation.”    One  client  said  that  the  process  
had  a  “Pollyanna  quality.”    On  the  other  hand,  sometimes  lawyers set up the process to
enable  parties  to  have  open  and  emotional  discussions  but  were  “unprepared  and  poorly  
equipped”  to  deal  with  them.    These  interactions  may  have  increased  the  risks  to  parties  
as  reflected  by  one  party’s  statement,  “I’m  scared  to  go  home  tonight.”61
Keet’s   study   found   that   the   process   of   lawyers   and   parties   working   together  
generally improved the negotiation environment. However, the negotiating environment
sometimes lulled parties into a false sense of security that the process would satisfy both
parties’  interests  rather  than  require  each  side  to  protect  its  own  interests.    Some  parties  
felt  pressed  to  “give  up”  more  than  they  thought  they  would  have  gotten  in  court  or  what  
they deserved. Parties who felt vulnerable sometimes felt abandoned by their lawyers
and  wondered  whether  there  was  someone  “on  their  side.”62 For six of the eight parties,
there were significant underlying power imbalances, which were often gender-related.
Four parties reported having experienced violence and/or emotional abuse in addition to
economic dependency. One of these parties thought that the abuse was well-handled in
the  process  and  she  participated  “without  being  interrupted  or  bullied.”    She  reached  an  
agreement that was better than she expected from litigation and she thought that the
process improved her relationship with her ex-husband. The other three parties thought
that  the  process  “reinforce[d]  their  feelings  of  insignificance”  and  their  lawyers  did  not  
protect them as they expected. They concluded that they should not have used CP. One
party, for example, thought that the process did not acknowledge or address patterns of
dominance and control in the negotiation. Another party thought that her husband was
“unreasonably   difficult”   and   she   was “basically   shamed”   by   both   lawyers   into   settling  
with him.63
In  Keet’s  study,  parties  sometimes  felt  unprotected  by  strict  commitment  to  fourway meetings as the main means of communication, with too little communication and
support from their lawyers outside these meetings. One party was frustrated by her
inability to meet separately with her lawyer during a four-way meeting. On the other
hand, some parties were unsettled when the other parties had private meetings with their
lawyers during a four-way. The process agreement often restricted direct communication
between parties outside of four-way meetings, though three parties, who felt victimized
by their husbands, noted that their husbands initiated these communications anyway.64
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2. Informed Consent and Screening for Appropriateness
Research   findings   varied   about   lawyers’   beliefs   regarding   the   necessity   or  
importance of screening cases for appropriateness and whether lawyers actually
conducted such screening effectively. Some of the differences may be due to differences
in local practice culture as well as increasing sophistication of lawyers and the CP
community over time.
Lande  and  Mosten’s  analysis  of  CP  texts  found  that  all  the  authors  argue  that  CP  
is not appropriate in some cases and that lawyers, clients, or both should consider
whether   CP   would   be   appropriate   in   particular   cases.      Summarizing   the  texts’   analysis,  
they found:
[T]here is a general consensus among the authors about the importance
of several factors and less agreement about others. In particular, all the
authors agree that personal motivation and suitability of the parties,
trustworthiness, and domestic violence are important factors for
assessing the appropriateness of the process. More than half of the books
indicate that mental illness, substance abuse, and suitability of the
lawyers also are important appropriateness factors. Less than half the
books refer to fear, intimidation of parties, or risks of disqualification.65
The texts generally said that these are factors to consider in assessing appropriateness but
the presence of any factor does not necessarily indicate that CP is inappropriate, in part,
depending on whether the parties retain additional professionals.66 An analysis of
practice group websites found much less discussion of factors relevant to appropriateness.
Many  websites  prominently  featured  “advantages”  of  CP  and  only  a  small  proportion  also  
identified   “disadvantages”   or   risks.67 Using a very liberal reading of references to
appropriateness factors, Lande and Mosten found:
Almost two-thirds of the websites identify factors relating to the parties'
personal motivation and suitability. Most of the websites do not identify
other factors presented in the [CP] books. Indeed, the next most
commonly cited factors are the parties' trustworthiness and suitability of
lawyers, which are mentioned in only about one-fifth of the websites.
Whereas virtually all of the books identify domestic abuse and mental
illness as appropriateness factors, less than one in six of the websites
mention these factors.68
Sefton’s   study   found   that   lawyers   stressed   that   initial   screening   was   a   “vital  
exercise,”  considering  the  financial  and  emotional  costs  if  the  parties  did  not  settle  in  CP.    
Some lawyers may not have done careful screening  in  “the  early  days,”  but  lawyers  said  
that this improved with experience.
They believed that factors relevant to
appropriateness  include  the  parties’  motives  and  abilities,  recognition  of  the  other  parties’  
and   children’s   needs,   realism   of   expectations, whether the intentions of the parties are
well matched, levels of mutual trust and respect, domestic abuse, mental health, and
substance abuse. Lawyers said that when parties did not settle, it was often because of
lack of mutual respect, unrealistic expectations, refusal to modify strong positions, or
desire to manipulate the process or the other side. Lawyers noted several cases that did
not settle because some lawyers found it difficult to adhere to the Collaborative process,
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which sometimes contributed   to   the   parties’   polarization.      Lawyers   thought   that   being  
able to trust the other lawyer was essential for a good CP process.69
Lawyers  in  Sefton’s  study  said  that  the  presence  of  problematic  factors  does  not  
“automatically   rule   out”   the   process   as they needed to consider all the circumstances.
They believed that in some cases it is appropriate to conduct an initial meeting with the
parties to observe their interactions without committing in advance to using a CP process.
In some cases, they would not undertake a CP case even if the clients wanted to do so.
Lawyers said that they review all the process options with clients and almost all of the
clients in the study said that the lawyers did so. Lawyers believed that if the clients did
not use CP in their most recently completed CP case, 49% would have been resolved
through direct negotiation between lawyers, 35% would have involved court proceedings,
and 8% would have been resolved through mediation with legal advice.70
In   Macfarlane’s   study,   many lawyers did not regularly screen cases for
appropriateness. At that time, there was no screening protocol in CP cases for domestic
violence. She found some cases where the parties used CP despite serious problems of
mistrust. In one case, a wife taped   the   couple’s   conversations   without   the   husband’s  
knowledge and the case ended without agreement. In another case, the wife had breast
cancer and the husband was having an affair with one of her friends. Despite these
challenges, the couple negotiated a complex settlement in a short period but, within a
month, the husband filed a motion in court to modify the agreement. Macfarlane
described another case where one party almost never spoke in face-to-face meetings,
which was a serious problem given CP norms requiring active party participation.
Lawyers’  capabilities  were  also  factors  relevant  to  appropriateness  as  Macfarlane  studied  
several high-conflict cases where the lawyers were unable to manage the process
effectively.71
Many of the lawyers in Macfarlane’s   study   had   little   experience   handling   CP  
cases and did not know enough to advise clients sufficiently to obtain effective informed
consent. Although lawyers thoroughly described the process, reviewing the participation
agreement in detail, the terminology was abstract and the lawyers themselves often did
not know what problems to anticipate. For example, lawyers may not have been prepared
to advise clients about possibly disclosing a prior or current romantic relationship,
discussing difficult issues with the other party, waiting for the other side to ponder a
proposal, considering the impact of a neutral evaluator, or incurring the practical and
emotional cost of starting a new lawyer if they – or the other party – decided to terminate
the process. In some cases, the parties did not understand the implications of the process
and parties complained that the process did not proceed as they had expected. Such
complaints dealt with a broad range of issues, including disclosure requirements, the pace
of negotiations, non-compliance with interim agreements, and calculation of fees.72
Macfarlane found that CP lawyers had varied views about mediation. She
described  a  “sibling  rivalry”  between  CP  and  mediation,  as  some  lawyers  anticipated  CP  
eventually  “taking  over”  mediation.    Some  motivation  for  CP  derived  from  the  “threat  to  
lawyers’  hegemony  posed  by  mediation.”    Some  lawyers  believed  that  mediation  should  
be   the   “first   resort,   not   a   last   resort”   whereas   others   “appear   to   see   little   use   for  
mediation, believing   collaborative   law   to   be   a   superior   process   in   every   respect.”    
Virtually all the lawyers said they explained mediation to their clients, though they
preferred and promoted CP. Many lawyers believed that mediation is appropriate only
for a limited population   of   “high-functioning, self-confident   and   articulate”   parties  
whereas   CP   “can   work   for   anyone,   short   of   someone   who   is   really   out   to   destroy   the  
process.”    They  believed  that  CP  offers  the  benefit  of  direct  legal  support  and  assistance,  
unlike mediation,  where  lawyers  do  not  participate  in  key  “moments  of  grace.”    Instead,  
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they   only   review   agreements,   playing   the   part   of   a   “paid   sniper”   who   has   no  
responsibility for the success of the process.73
In the Wiegers & Keet study, most of the lawyers said  that  they  offered  CP  “as  a  
matter  of  course,”  leaving  it  for  clients  to  decide  what  process  to  use.    Some  lawyers  said  
that  they  would  not  recommend  it  in  “limited  circumstances”  but  there  was  no  consensus  
about what factors would be relevant to appropriateness. They varied in whether they
screened cases for domestic violence or emotional abuse. In considering power
imbalances, most seemed to focus on lack of information or individual incapacity rather
than economic dependency, gender roles, or abuse. One lawyer said that power
imbalances were not relevant to whether CP is appropriate. Lawyers thought that power
imbalances could be remedied through education, support, information sharing, and good
process management.74
In   Keet’s   study,   half   of   the   parties thought that their lawyers should have
questioned whether the case was appropriate for CP, which they apparently did not do.
Parties in cases with power imbalances had differing views about this. One was very
satisfied with the process, whereas others  regretted  it.    Another  said  that  his  case  “should  
never  have  been  allowed  to  go  into  the  process.”75
The IACP data provides insights about factors related to termination without
settlement. Overall, 90% of cases settled and 10% terminated without settlement
(“terminated”).    Of  the  cases  rated  as  “difficult”  or  “very  difficult,”  however,  77%  settled  
and 23% terminated. Eighty-five percent of the terminated cases were difficult (59%
“very  difficult”  and  26%  “difficult”).76 In difficult cases that terminated, the following
factors were identified as significantly contributing to the termination: one or more
parties   “invaded”   the   other’s   privacy   (43%   of   difficult   terminated   cases),   one   or   both  
parties obtained outside advice (38%), verbal abuse (37%), difficulty in cooperation
between parties (37%), reluctance to disclose information (36%), threats to go to court
(35%), unilateral action by one or more parties (34%), unrealistic expectations about the
process (33%), unrealistic expectations about the outcome (29%), mental health issues of
one or more parties (29%), and distrust of the other party or professionals (29%).77 In
addition, several factors were not statistically significant but may nonetheless have
contributed to termination. These included extreme lack of empathy (26% of difficult
terminated cases), imbalance of power (25%), and one or more parties believing that the
other party contributed nothing of value to the process (24%).78
3. Disclosure of Information
The CP process requires parties to voluntarily exchange all relevant information.
Several studies found uncertainties about what information should be provided or
difficulties with disclosure.
Lande’s   study   of   Cooperative   lawyers   included   questions   about   how   they  
defined   “full   disclosure,”   which   may   be   similar   to   the   views   of   Collaborative   lawyers.    
Indeed, more than half of the subjects also had handled CP cases. Subjects were given
seven hypothetical situations and asked whether they believed that their clients: (1) had a
duty to disclose information, (2) did not have a duty to disclose information but they
would encourage clients to do so anyway, or (3) did not have a duty to disclose, but
would not encourage them to do so. In addition, the subjects were asked if the party had
a duty to initiate disclosure and/or to disclose the information in response to a question
from the other side. The fact patterns were designed to raise challenging problems and
the subjects gave consistent answers in only one of seven situations. Part of the difficulty
may have been that the scenarios did not provide the full context that would normally
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affect lawyers' judgments in actual cases. The only question that respondents answered
consistently involved a situation where alimony was at issue and the party was just
informed that s/he received a promotion. In that situation, about 90% of respondents said
that the party had a duty to initiate disclosure as well as respond to a direct question about
the issue. Although lawyers varied in their responses to the other hypotheticals, there
was a general pattern favoring disclosure when the facts were legally relevant and events
had already occurred rather than being anticipated in the future. Even when lawyers
believed that there was no duty to disclose information, they often said that lawyers
should encourage clients to do so, especially in response to a question from the other
party.79
In  Sefton’s  study,  lawyers  said  that  some  clients  were  reluctant  to  disclose  all  of  
the relevant financial information, which was usually out of desire to save time and
money rather than to gain partisan advantage.80 In  Macfarlane’s  study,  there  was  some  
difficulty in at least one case about what information was expected to be disclosed. A
husband  suspected  that  his  wife’s  new partner was reimbursing some expenses and asked
her to bring in credit card statements for reassurance.81 Although the lawyers believed
that this was not legally relevant, they encouraged her to provide this information so that
the  husband  could  “move  on.”82 The wife felt that this was an invasion of her privacy.83
4. Perceived Significance of the Disqualification Agreement
Researchers found that Collaborative lawyers generally believed that the
disqualification agreement was very important, but the parties had mixed opinions about
it and sometimes misunderstood its purpose.
In   Sefton’s   study,   the   lawyers   believed   that   the   disqualification   agreement   was  
important  because  it  built  commitment  as  it  made  everyone  “think  twice”  before  ending  
negotiation. Although lawyers reported that some clients were apprehensive about losing
their lawyers if they did not reach an agreement, lawyers reassured them that the process
would work if the parties were properly screened and prepared.84 On the other hand,
lawyers  recognized  that  the  disqualification  provision  could  result  in  “undue  pressure”  to  
settle and that clients should be advised that they need not feel they have to reach an
agreement.85
Lande’s   study   found   that   80%   of   CP   lawyers   believed   that   the   disqualification
agreement   “can   be   helpful   as   [an]   indicator   that   everyone   intends   to   act   in   good   faith”  
and  90%  believed  they  “can  be  helpful  by  giving  people  an  incentive  to  make  an  extra  
effort  to  settle  rather  than  immediately  go  to  court”.86 Twenty-two percent believed that
the   CP   process   “puts   too   much   pressure   on   a   substantial   number   of   parties,   especially  
weaker   parties,”   and   40%   believed   that   “a   substantial   number   of   parties   in   a  
Collaborative case are likely to feel abandoned by their lawyers if they need  to  litigate”.87
In   Schwab’s   survey,   35%   of   lawyers   said   the   disqualification   provision   was  
"very significant" in influencing their clients to remain in negotiations, 43% said it was
"somewhat  significant,”  and  22%  said  it  was  "not  at  all  significant."88 Of the clients who
reached agreement in a CP process, 45% said that the disqualification provision had kept
them at the table when they would have otherwise gone to court while 55% said that it
had not kept them in negotiation.89
Sefton’s   study   found   that most clients accurately understood the nature and
purpose of the disqualification agreement. However, two clients misunderstood the
disqualification agreement, thinking that it was necessary to preserve a legal privilege or
that it precluded their right to litigate.90 Clients said that the disqualification provision
generally did not affect their decisions in the process, though some said that it reinforced
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their determination to settle without going to court. One client said that the emotional
cost of losing the lawyer kept him or her in the process. Although some clients made
concessions that they would have preferred to avoid, it appeared that the disqualification
agreement did not cause them to do so.91
Macfarlane found that parties had differing views about the disqualification
agreement. Some felt that it was helpful to make the parties commit to the process,
realizing the costs would be a lot greater if they did not settle.92 Others  were  “mystified  
by the lengths to which their lawyers believed that they must go to remove the possibility
of  litigation.”93 One frustrated client felt stuck in the process after investing $24,000 and
nine months with little to show for it.94 Macfarlane found that the CP process fosters
cooperation in interest-based negotiation, but could not determine whether this was
caused by the disqualification agreement.95
In  Keet’s  study,  most  of  the  lawyers  believed  that  the  disqualification  provision  
was fundamental to CP, though almost all said that they were experimenting using a
process without it because of client resistance.96 Parties in CP cases were less convinced
of the need for the disqualification provision than the lawyers.97 For example, three
parties indicated that they would have used the process without it.98 Another three
misunderstood its purpose, thinking that it was supposed to provide confidentiality rather
than an incentive to negotiate.99 One party said she thought that it had more to do with
lawyers  “wanting  to  keep  their  boundaries  clear  as  opposed  to  helping  families.”100 Four
parties who felt vulnerable noted that they had invested a lot in their lawyers and felt that
the disqualification agreement put them at a disadvantage (or, in one case, would have
done so).101 Even a party who was generally satisfied with  the  process  “went  home  and  
lost  sleep  over”  the  fear  of  losing  her  lawyer.102 Her husband threatened not to show up,
which   she   said   “felt   like   another   victimization   thing.”103 Another party said the
disqualification   agreement   contributed   to   her   husband’s decision not to abide by their
agreement because he knew it would be hard for her to get a new lawyer.104
5. Settlement Rates and Outcomes
Parties settle a large proportion of CP cases. In general, the settlements seemed
comparable to what parties would have agreed to in negotiation in a traditional litigation
process. In some cases, the results of the ultimate agreement were clearly better than
what parties would presumably have otherwise agreed to, thus benefitting the parties and
their children. In some cases, weaker parties felt pressured to settle.
The IACP research found that 86% of cases involved settlement agreements, 3%
involved reconciliations, and 10% terminated without agreement or reconciliation. 105 In
Schwab’s  study,  lawyers  reported  an overall settlement rate of 87% and a 92% settlement
rate of their latest cases.106 Sefton reported an overall settlement rate of 83% for
settlement of all issues plus 4% for settlement of some issues.107 Of lawyers reporting
their latest completed case, 92% reported full agreement and 4% reported partial
agreement.108
In   Sefton’s   study,   most   clients   thought   that   using   a   CP   process   had   avoided  
damage to their children.109 In  some  cases,  clients  believed  that  it  improved  the  parties’  
relationship generally.110 Macfarlane found that the overall decisions in CP settlements
were generally no different from what the parties would have gotten in a traditional
litigation-negotiation process.111 However, in several cases, to meet important needs of
both parties, some parties agreed to provide more than legally required.112 Parties had
deeper discussions and, as a result, tailored the arrangements to meet their needs that
otherwise would not have been possible in litigation or traditional negotiation.113 In some

Lande / AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF COLLABORATIVE PRACTICE

17

cases, the process improved communication and presumably improved decision making
about co-parenting.114 Macfarlane generally did not find data indicating that weaker
parties received less favorable outcomes than they otherwise would have received. 115
However, weaker parties  may  have  felt  pressured  to  settle,  especially  when  their  lawyers’  
commitment to the process appeared to outweigh their commitment to the clients or when
the other party was intimidating or abusive.116
6. Time and Cost of the Process
Studies reported that parties paid substantial amounts for the CP process, with
variation based on geography, case difficulty, whether the parties had children, and use of
professionals. There were mixed findings about whether parties saved time and money
compared to other available processes.
The IACP study reported that 15% of cases took less than three months, 47%
took less than seven months, and 80% took less than a year.117 The average cost of a CP
case for both parties was $23,963.118 This figure includes the cost of core professionals –
lawyers, mental health professionals, financial professionals, and mediators – but does
not include neutral experts such as appraisers and pension valuation experts.119 The
average cost for cases without children was $18,150, and the average cost for cases with
children subject to the legal process was $25,800.120 The cost was related to the level of
difficulty which, in turn, was related to the configuration of professionals used. The
average   cost   for   cases   rated   as   “easy”   or   “very   easy”   was   $12,100   compared   with  
$32,900   for   cases   rated   as   “difficult”   or   “very   difficult.”121 Twenty-nine percent of
lawyer-only cases, 54% of referral model cases, and 47% of team model cases were rated
as  “difficult”  or  “very  difficult.”    The  cost  was  $15,426 in lawyer-only cases, $22,466 if
additional  professionals  were  used  in  a  “referral  model,”  and  $34,860  for  cases  using  a  
“team  model.”122 There were significant geographic differences as well; for example, the
average cost in Minnesota was $14,431 compared with $41,056 in California.123 In
IACP’s   Client   Experience   Study,   90%   of   clients   said   that   all   the   professionals   in   their  
case were necessary to achieve their goals.124 Clients generally believed that the fees
paid to their lawyers (83%), mental health professionals (80%), and financial
professionals  (76%)  were  “somewhat”  or  “very  reasonable.”125
In   Schwab’s   study,   cases   took   an   average   of   six   months   to   reach   settlement.126
Lawyers reported conducting an average of 4.3 four-way meetings per case and billing
clients an average of 28.7 hours for completed cases.127 Clients reported spending an
average of $8,777 on legal, expert, and filing fees.128
Most   of   the   lawyers   in   Sefton’s   study   thought   that   cases   handled   in   CP   were  
likely to be completed more quickly and cheaply than in an alternative process.129 Asked
about their most recently completed cases, 77% of the lawyers said that CP was shorter
than if handled in negotiation, 67% said it was shorter than litigation, and 42% said that it
was shorter than mediation.130 The estimated time savings of CP was up to 3 months in
55% of cases, 3-6 months in 34% of cases, and 6-12 months in 11% of cases.131 Twentysix percent of lawyers said that CP cost less than if handled in negotiation and 47% said it
cost less than if litigated.132 No lawyers said that it would cost less than mediation and
50% said that it would cost more than mediation.133 In 29% of 42 cases where lawyers
thought that clients saved money in CP, the estimated cost savings were up to £1,000.134
The savings were £1,000-£3,000 in 33% of cases, £3,000-£5,000 in 14% of cases,
£5,000-£10,000 in 14% of cases, and £10,000-£20,000 in 10% of cases.135 In 30% of 10
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cases where lawyers thought that clients paid more money in CP, the additional cost was
up to £1,000.136 In 70% of these cases, the additional cost was £1,000-£3,000.137
Half  the  lawyers  in  Lande’s  study  believed  that  the  Collaborative  process  “cost[  ]  
a   substantial   number   of   clients   more   than   necessary.”138 In   Sharples’   survey,   66%   of  
clients believed that they saved money and 59% said that the divorce proceeded in a
timely manner, though some complained about the amount of time and money
required.139 In   Cox’s   survey,   12%   responded   to   open-ended questions that they liked
reduction of costs, and 5% liked the speed and efficiency.140 31% least liked wasted time
and 12% least liked higher-than-expected costs.141
Macfarlane found that some clients were attracted by promises of a speedy and
inexpensive  process  and  were  “bitterly  disappointed  with  their  final  bill  and  disillusioned
by   how   long   it   [had]   taken   for   them   to   reach   a   resolution.”142 Many clients were
frustrated by the amount of time spent discussing the process before they could address
the substantive issues.143 Some complained that the other party dragged out the process
and  that  the  lawyers  did  not  “hurry  up  the  other  side.”144 The  process  proceeded  “at  the  
speed  of  the  slowest  participant,”  which  helped  parties  who  needed  time,  but  sometimes  
caused tension when the other party wanted to move faster.145 In effect, the process
seemed  to  “pander”  to  one  party’s  unwillingness  to  make  decisions,  sometimes  causing  a  
strong   sense   of   “disempowerment”   by   the   other   party,   leading   to   pressure   to   make  
concessions.146 Some were frustrated with the cost, especially when the process took
longer than they felt was necessary, or when they did not expect to be billed for
discussions between professionals outside joint meetings.147
7. Clients’  Evaluations  of  Their  Experiences
The studies reported that many clients were satisfied with their CP experiences,
though some clients were frustrated by various aspects of the process.
In  Schwab’s  study,  clients  gave  an  average  satisfaction  rating  of  4.35  regarding  
the outcome of their divorce (on a scale of one to five, with five being the most
satisfied).148 In  Cox’s  survey,  all  the  clients  said  that  their  lawyers  showed  them  respect,  
listened and understood what was said, were available when needed, explained matters
clearly, and promptly returned phone calls and emails.149 More than 90% said that they
would consider retaining their lawyer for future legal matters and refer others to their
lawyer and to the CP process.150 In response to open-ended questions about what they
liked best about the process, 48% indicated that they liked the safe environment, 31%
liked having control over the outcome, a better outcome, or avoidance of court, 26%
liked professionalism or a positive process, and 21% liked dealing with issues directly
and being respected.151 In response to what they liked least, 23% disliked the other
party’s   lack   of   commitment   to   cooperate,   12%   expressed   disappointment   with   the  
outcome or the inexperience of a lawyer, and 8% complained about inadequate
explanation of the process or feeling disrespected or threatened.152
In   Sharples’   survey, most clients were generally pleased with the process.
Ninety-three percent of those clients with children said that the interests of the children
were better served by a CP process, 86% felt free to ask questions and express interests,
perspectives, and values. Eighty-three percent felt respected by the professionals, 83%
would recommend CP to others, 80% were satisfied with the overall experience, and 75%
were satisfied with the result.153 Seventy-one percent said that both sides acted honorably
in disclosing information, 69% said that both spouses had control of the divorce process
and outcome, 63% believed that the discussions were productive, and 60% believed that
they were able to generate creative solutions meeting their needs.154 In the interviews,
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89% of the subjects indicated that they valued a safe environment in the process, 31%
valued controlling the outcome, avoiding court, protecting children, tailoring the process
to fit their needs, and encouraging civility and respect.155 Seventy-two percent expressed
some disappointment with such things as inexperienced professionals, time and cost, and
lack of cooperation by others in the process.156
In  Sefton’s  study,  eleven  of  the  twelve  clients  were  comfortable  that  they  could  at  
least live with the outcome and some were outright enthusiastic.157 One client was
“equivocal”  about  the  outcome.158 Seven clients had positive assessments of the process
without reservations; three were positive overall but had some reservations.159 One client
felt that CP was the right process for her even though it was very difficult; another client
had a negative evaluation.160 Clients’  satisfaction  with  the  process  was  affected  by  how  
well the parties got along, which ranged from quite well to quite tense.161 Most clients
said that they found the process to be emotionally difficult at times, which was probably
related  to  the  quality  of  the  parties’  relationships  and  amount  of  support  they  received  in  
the process.162
In   Keet’s   study,   two   parties   were   satisfied   with   the   process,   three were
ambivalent, and three were dissatisfied.163 The   parties’   perceptions   of   success   were  
largely related to whether they reached agreement.164 In some cases, one party did not
comply with an agreement, which caused dissatisfaction with the process.165 The length
of the process also affected satisfaction and most parties were surprised that it took longer
than they expected.166 Parties were frustrated when they felt that the other party took too
long to make decisions.167 Parties were also surprised by the emotional intensity in the
process, which they often found problematic.168
C. LOCAL PRACTICE GROUPS AND IMPACT ON LEGAL PRACTICE
Research suggested that local practice groups affected practice in CP cases and
litigation generally.
Macfarlane found the local CP practice groups created local structures and
membership rules that were fairly similar to each other.169 These groups played a
“gatekeeping   function”   by   establishing   membership   requirements   such   as   training   and  
practice experience.170 Renewal requirements included continuing education, attendance
at group meetings, and payment of dues.171 At the time, groups were considering whether
to limit membership to lawyers or include other CP professionals.172 In each local
practice group, there was a strong motivation to establish a uniformity of practice, though
the practices varied from one group to another.173 Although the CP process is intended to
be   flexible,   practitioners   “rapidly   [became]   consumed   with   concerns   about   purity   of  
practice.”174 Most groups found that there was not a substantial volume of CP cases and
many trained CP lawyers were frustrated by the lack of CP cases to work on.175
Several   lawyers   in   Sefton’s   study   said   that   CP   practice   affected   their   legal  
practice in non-CP cases as they were more likely to have face-to-face meetings and use
additional professionals.176
In  Lande’s  study,  lawyers  believed  that  Collaborative  practice  had  affected  legal  
practice generally. They identified numerous changes in litigation-oriented practice
including   “less   rush   to   set   court   hearings   and   less   aggressiveness   in   litigation.”      In  
addition,
[T]hey mentioned greater efforts to (1) be informal, respectful,
cooperative, and trusting; (2) have candid conversations; (3) elicit client
input; (4) voluntarily exchange information; (5) use four-way meetings
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and productive negotiation techniques; (6) use coaches and shared
experts; (7) use mental health providers more creatively to help address
the needs of the children; and (8) use mediation.177
III. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
The preceding review provides a mosaic of findings from different settings using
different research methods. Some disparities in findings are likely to reflect differences
in   focus,   with   some   studies   focusing   more   on   the   “parts   of   the   glass”   that   are   full   and  
others focusing more on the parts that are empty. Each study provides only a partial view
but together, they offer the best approximation of the present reality. Although it is a
plausible overall portrait, readers should be cautious about making strong or confident
generalizations based on this data. Indeed, it would be helpful to have more research,
considering the limited amount of data that has been collected and the methodological
limitations of the research.178 This part discusses suggestions for future research.
I begin with a suggestion about how not to conduct research. It is tempting to
study  whether  CP  “works.”    In  my  view,  this  is  the  wrong  question  for  several  reasons.    
First, CP is not a single, uniform phenomenon. It varies along many dimensions and
different variations are likely to contribute to very different results. Second, the
individuals involved – parties, lawyers, and other professionals – are   the   “active  
ingredients,”   not   some   inanimate   procedure.179 Some individuals make CP work well
and  others  do  not.    Third,  the  meaning  of  “works”  is  ambiguous.    Often,  people  think  of  
success simply in terms of settlement, but this implies that all settlements are desirable
(even if due to coercion) and that all cases without settlement are undesirable (even if the
process leads to later settlement or greater understanding). Parties have varying goals
and analysts should focus on particular goals, including, but not limited to, settlement.
Settlement rates are of particular interest in CP cases because high settlement rates could
indicate excessive settlement pressure and/or effective diversion of inappropriate cases
through screening. It would be important to try to separate causes of settlement, but this
should be the beginning, not the end of the inquiry about how well CP works. Because of
multiple inter-related causal factors, research about this and other causal theories should
include multivariate statistical analyses to separate the effects of the factors, if possible.
Clearly,  CP  “works”  well  in  some  situations  and  not  in  others.    Thus,  the  better  
questions are how often are parties satisfied, and under what circumstances are they most
(and least) likely to achieve particular goals. Research on other dispute resolution
processes  has  used  numerous  variables  to  reflect  parties’  goals  such  as  satisfaction  with  
the process and outcome, impact on children, effect on future communication and
relationships, and the time and cost invested, among others. Some of the factors that
might  contribute  to  the  achievement  of  parties’  goals  include  whether  professionals  have  
had   basic   CP   training,   professionals’   level   of   continuing   education,   professionals’  
problem-solving  mindset,  lawyers’  conceptions  of  their  roles,  allocation of responsibility
between lawyers and clients, configuration of professional services used, the timing of
hiring professionals, level of case difficulty, client characteristics, particular procedures
used (such as case screening and informed consent), and benefit of CP statutes or court
rules.
Research on CP has identified some problems; it would be useful to estimate the
frequency of the problems and, more importantly, identify factors causally contributing to
them. These problems include parties being surprised by the process, lack of appropriate
client support by lawyers, undetected domestic abuse or other risk factors, intentional
misrepresentation,  lack  of  factual  disclosure,  experience  of  “entrapment”  in  the  process,  
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excessive or inappropriate settlement pressure, abuse of the process, and excessive time
and   cost.   Some   factors   that   may   contribute   to   such   problems   include   professionals’  
adversarial mindsets, lack of CP training, lack of experience within their discipline (e.g.,
law or mental health),  lack  of  experience  doing  CP  cases,  lawyers’  conceptions  of  their  
roles, lack of (or poor quality) case screening, lack of (or poor quality) informed consent
procedures, level of case difficulty, client characteristics, and particular procedures used
(or not used).
In addition to questions about the ultimate effects of CP in particular cases, it
would   be   helpful   to   get   a   better   description   of   the   “players”   and   the   process.      For  
example, the research so far suggests that CP appeals primarily to highly-educated,
upper-income Caucasian parties. Is this accurate and, if so, why? For example, does this
reflect a therapeutic orientation of the process that is generally more attractive to this
population? What changes in CP process would make it more attractive to other
populations?
In what proportion of CP cases is there a history of violent or coercive
relationships, how often do the lawyers and other professionals identify these
relationships early in the process, what measures are taken to address them, and how
effective are these interventions?
Why have parties used CP so rarely in non-family cases?180 The disqualification
agreement,  which  puts  the  continuation  of  the  clients’  relationships  with  their  lawyers  at  
risk, is an essential element of the CP process.    Is  it  a  major  barrier  to  parties’  willingness  
to use CP in non-family cases? Do parties in non-family cases place greater value on
their relationships with their lawyers than parties in family cases? What are the
perceptions of parties and lawyers in non-family cases about CP? It would be helpful to
conduct studies of disputants who do not use CP to learn why they do not use it, what
process features are particularly important to them, and what features they do not want.
How well does Macfarlane’s  typology  of  Collaborative  lawyers181 fit in practice?
Although few lawyers are likely to fit exclusively into any of the categories, do they
provide  useful  concepts  for  describing  and  analyzing  lawyers’  mindsets  and  behaviors?
If it is a useful typology, can researchers develop reliable indicators of the different
types? Do different types of lawyers use different procedures and contribute to different
outcomes? What is the impact of initial and continuing training, local practice norms,
formal ethical standards of the Collaborative community, legal ethics rules, and CP
statutes  on  lawyers’  behaviors?
What procedures do Collaborative lawyers use to screen cases for
appropriateness, provide necessary information to clients, and obtain informed consent?
What   are   potential   clients’   perceptions   of   CP   based   on   lawyers’   and   practice   group  
websites, the mass media, and other sources? What criteria do lawyers use to assess
appropriateness? How do they describe the benefits and risks of CP and other processes?
How well do prospective clients understand the information that lawyers provide? How
realistic   are   prospective   clients’   expectations   about   the   process,   both   before   and   after  
initial consultations with lawyers? How much do prospective clients feel that lawyers are
recommending   CP   or   other   processes   based   on   the   clients’   needs   as   opposed   to   the  
lawyers’  own  general  preferences  about  CP  and  other  processes?
Some Collaborative practitioners have strong views about the importance and
benefits of particular CP models. Controlling for variables such as case difficulty, what
difference does it make, if any, if parties use a lawyers-only, referral, or team model?
What differences, if any, result from using one-coach or two-coach models?
Research to date has found that lawyers generally believe that the disqualification
agreement is important, but a substantial proportion of clients do not necessarily agree,
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and some find it harmful. What are the effects of the disqualification agreement? Are
there particular types of cases in which it would be particularly beneficial or harmful? 182
For example, is CP particularly beneficial when the parties trust each other, feel confident
to assert their interests, and can readily afford to hire litigation counsel if needed?
Conversely, is CP particularly problematic when one party feels seriously intimidated by
the other and unable to afford litigation counsel?
Many Collaborative practitioners believe that certain procedures are necessary
and/or very effective, including: detailed review of participation agreements at the first
face-to-face meeting; deferring discussion of substantive issues until the second meeting;
limiting negotiation to face-to-face meetings; limiting the amount of consultation
between lawyers and clients during negotiation; restricting the amount or nature of legal
advice; steering discussion away from past events; dealing with (or avoiding) emotional
issues;;  and  using  particular  definitions  of  “relevant”  in  determining  the  scope  of  required  
information disclosures. What are the benefits and problems caused by each of these
procedures? How much are Collaborative professionals willing to deviate from local
practice  norms  to  tailor  the  process  to  particular  clients’  needs  or  preferences?    How  do  
such deviations benefit or hurt clients?
CP presumably has some effect on traditional legal practice. To what extent do
Collaborative practitioners do things differently in other processes, especially litigation,
as a result of their CP training and experience? How does CP practice affect other
processes, if at all? For example, do lawyers with no CP training or experience
increasingly suggest using face-to-face meetings with clients in negotiation or engaging
additional professionals in the process?
Most of the research to date has focused on the individuals involved and process
used in CP cases. Very little has addressed the sociology of CP as a professional
movement, which merits serious examination. Local practice groups are a distinctive
feature of the Collaborative movement that are likely to have some significant effects.
The membership requirements presumably lead to increased education and quality of
practice. These groups create local practice norms, which can lead to shared
understandings and procedures and increased predictability. On the other hand, the same
dynamics can lead to orthodoxy, inhibition of innovation, inflexibility about tailoring the
process  to  fit  particular  clients’  needs,  and  exclusion  of  some  lawyers  (such  as  racial  or  
ethnic minorities).    The  “club”  dynamic  that  Macfarlane  described  can  be  inclusive  and  
supportive, or exclusive and harmful. Considering that practitioners in local groups have
ongoing relationships with each other, to what extent, if any, do they give greater
allegiance to their Collaborative colleagues than their clients? To what extent do
practitioners within a practice group rely on referrals from each other and how does that
affect their actions in CP cases, if at all? What factors contribute to beneficial and
problematic effects of practice groups?
The Collaborative movement is worth studying as a professional movement with
a life cycle including formation, experimentation, consolidation, maturation, and
institutionalization. It has a founding story, heroes, villains, internal controversies, and a
political life. To what extent is there tension between practitioners who believe strongly
in the importance of maintaining what they see as the integrity of the process and those
who react against what they see as orthodoxy? Are there significant differences between
the attitudes and behavior of the first generation of practitioners (who essentially invented
CP) and later generations (who started practicing in an established CP environment and
inherited standardized procedures)? To what extent, if any, are there succession struggles
between founders and later arrivals? How have members of the CP movement managed
their internal conflicts in their cases and within their practice groups?

Lande / AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF COLLABORATIVE PRACTICE

23

The Collaborative movement has complex relationships with the broader dispute
resolution and legal communities, which are also worth studying. Much of the theory and
emotion in the movement reflects intensely negative characterizations of lawyers, courts,
and litigation, and yet the Collaborative movement has made significant efforts to court
the legal establishment, with some success. The legal community has similarly mixed
reactions, with some elements warmly embracing the CP movement and others
expressing hostility.
The Collaborative movement reflects a deep ambivalence about mediation, which
Macfarlane   called   a   “sibling   rivalry.”183 Some Collaborative practitioners appreciate
their professional roots in the mediation world and some see little value in mediation for
clients. Collaborative lawyers vary in their discussion about mediation as an option when
considering what process to use. Even in cases with lawyers who have positive
orientations toward mediation, mediators are rarely hired. Wiegers and Keet described a
“professional   turf   war”   between   the   two   movements,184 which includes competition for
business as well as ideological legitimacy. This is a two-way street as some mediators
have mirror-image concerns about the Collaborative movement. Similarly, there has
been significant mutual hostility between the Collaborative movement and its muchsmaller  “sibling,”  the  Cooperative  movement,  which  poses  a  serious  ideological  threat  by  
challenging the necessity of the disqualification agreement, the central element of
Collaborative doctrine.
It is ironic -- and probably significant -- that the Collaborative movement is itself
the focus of so much conflict. The causes and manifestations of this phenomenon are
worth empirical study. For example, to what extent are these conflicts due to the
emergence of an innovative movement that, by definition, challenges the status quo? Are
there elements of Collaborative theory that make it particularly susceptible to such
conflict? To what extent, if any, does prior adversarial litigation experience and/or
“quasi-religious   conversion”   of   some   Collaborative   practitioners   contribute   to   this  
conflict? To what extent are these conflicts the result of decisions of leaders and members
of the Collaborative community? What are the similarities and differences between the
Collaborative and transformational mediation movements that could help explain the
dynamics of both movements?
Macfarlane noted that proponents of innovative dispute resolution processes
often   respond   to   the   potential   for   “bad   press”   by   minimizing   problems   with   their  
innovations.185 It would be foreseeable that Collaborative leaders would want to design
research to highlight the benefits of CP and avoid focusing on problems. To its credit,
the IACP Research Committee has collected and published data that suggests problems as
well as benefits of CP. Although Collaborative practitioners might feel uncomfortable
about  some  of  the  preceding  questions,  it  is  ultimately  in  the  Collaborative  movement’s  
interest – and, most importantly, its  clients’  interests  – to candidly recognize its problems.
Every human institution has problems and people cannot effectively solve problems
without first understanding them. Other dispute resolution processes, such as mediation
and arbitration, are the subjects of vigorous research and debate, which contribute to the
advancement of those fields. Pursuing research about CP should benefit Collaborative
clients, practitioners, and leaders, policymakers, and dispute resolution and legal
theorists.
IV. CONCLUSION
At the twentieth anniversary of the development of CP, this review of empirical
studies provides a good opportunity to take stock of the Collaborative movement and
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identify issues for the future. In a very short time, the movement has achieved
remarkable success in developing an impressive methodology of practice, elaborate
organizational infrastructure, enthusiastic and growing community of practitioners, and
increasing public legitimacy. Like every human institution, the CP movement and
practice has some problems. Thus, some obvious goals would be to build on the
successes and effectively address problems.
The research suggests that CP is especially attractive to a fairly narrow segment
of the population of legal clients, which largely consists of relatively well-educated and
well-off divorcing spouses. It appears that the client population using CP generally is
very satisfied, so CP practitioners should continue doing what works well for these
clients. However, some proportion of CP clients are dissatisfied and practitioners should
consider what measures might reduce or avoid dissatisfactions.
For example,
practitioners might guide clients who are inappropriate for CP to other processes, set
more realistic client expectations at the outset, reduce the cost as much as reasonably
possible,  and  flexibly  tailor  the  process  to  suit  clients’  needs.    Several  studies  identified  
cost as a particular concern, so practitioners should consider ways to economize
responsibly and have candid conversations with clients about the costs and benefits of
various procedural options. Many practitioners strongly believe in the value of a process
assembling a full team of professionals at the outset. This approach can result in cost
savings in some cases, but it can also cost more than some parties need, want, or can
afford.
At least as important, if the CP movement is to grow beyond a narrow niche
practice, its leaders should develop an effective strategy to expand the client base. This
would involve making CP more attractive to more lower- and middle-income clients and
finding an effective way to serve legal aid clients. Although the Collaborative process
theoretically could be used in many types of cases other than divorce, very few parties
with these cases choose CP despite concerted efforts to promote its use. Rather than
simply encouraging parties to use a CP process, CP leaders could conduct needs
assessment research to learn what these clients want and tailor services to fit their needs
and interests. This would reflect an important shift in emphasis from promoting a
particular  process  to  crafting  processes  to  satisfy  parties’  needs.    For  example,  since  the  
disqualification agreement is a barrier for some parties, some CP practitioners should
offer Cooperative practice (which does not include attorney disqualification) in addition
to CP.
Related to the issues about the CP client population, the CP movement should
consider how it can continue to satisfy its constituent professionals and attract new ones.
Clearly, the movement is satisfying the interests of a substantial body of lawyers and
other professionals in the US and around the world. Many yearn to provide high-quality
service to clients and work collaboratively with professional colleagues, including
lawyers  who  represent  the  “opposing”  party.    Many  professionals  value  the  combination  
of local and international organizations, conferences, continuing education programs,
procedural protocols, and perhaps most importantly, a shared sense of purpose and
identity. CP leaders should continue and enhance these efforts.
While  the  CP   movement  attracts  lawyers  who  see  CP  as  a  “calling”  or  a  better  
way to practice law, other lawyers undoubtedly perceive CP as distasteful. Some identify
CP with family law, which some lawyers find too emotional. This negative perception
may be reinforced by the emphasis on inter-disciplinary practice. Some lawyers are
probably   also   “turned   off”   by   intensely   negative   statements   by   some   Collaborative  
practitioners about the law, litigation, and lawyers.
For example, triumphal
proclamations   that   CP   represents   a   “paradigm   shift”   imply   its   moral   superiority   and  
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litigation’s   inferiority,   which   can   seem   unnecessarily   arrogant   and   insulting   to   many  
lawyers. To attract mainstream lawyers who might be interested in offering CP services,
leaders and practitioners in the Collaborative movement may need to change the content
and tone of their rhetoric and affirmatively acknowledge the importance of litigation and
lawyers. Projecting respect for the legal system is also important for CP to develop broad
acceptance and legitimacy.
The CP movement also has some repair work to do with the mediation and
broader ADR community. Although some Collaborative lawyers fairly discuss the
mediation option with clients and speak about it respectfully, others have not acted
appropriately in this regard. Mediation can be especially appropriate for parties who
need or want to save money on professional fees in their case. Mediators can also be
helpful members of Collaborative teams in some cases.186
These suggestions are not intended to imply that all Collaborative practitioners
have behaved problematically or that other professionals have not contributed to
unhelpful inter-professional conflicts. As described above, Collaborative practitioners
have generated impressive accomplishments and deserve great credit for their idealism,
persistence, and seriousness. Moreover, the attitudes and behaviors of some lawyers and
mediators have not been appropriately  respectful  of  CP  and  parties’  legitimate  interests  in  
using CP. Rather than focusing on which professionals are to blame, however, this is to
suggest that each group fairly accept responsibility for its contributions to unhelpful
conflict and, more importantly, take actions to deal with it constructively.
In another article, I wrote the following assessment of CP, which is still fitting.
Many [CP] practitioners have devoted great effort to develop this
significant new model of practice, which is designed to make the
interest-based approach the norm in negotiation. Getting people to use
an interest-based approach instead of the traditional, positional approach
has been a difficult problem. ADR experts have provided helpful
suggestions  for  “changing  the  game,”  though  these  are  usually  limited  to  
case-by-case efforts within a culture of adversarial negotiation. [CP] is
an ingenious mechanism to generally reverse the traditional presumption
that negotiators will use adversarial negotiation. In addition, it develops
a new legal culture by institutionalizing local practice groups and has
great potential to develop more reflective practice. The ADR field has
much to learn from [CP]'s achievements and challenges.187
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